Stephen Kimber

 Oct 1, 1997

At 11 p.m. on October 1, 1997—just three weeks after the Copacabana bombing—Michael Kozak, the head of the United States Interests Section in Havana telephoned a contact in the Cuban Ministry of the Interior to pass on a warning from Washington. The United States had received information from “a third party” about the possibility of yet another bomb being set off in a tourist area, he said, and offered details of what they claimed they’d learned from their source.

Four days later, Cuban officials summoned Kozak to their offices to read him a message to send back to Washington: “We wish to let [the American government] know that the source which provided them with this information has been shown to be truthful. We have acted with utmost discretion, as we were asked to do. We are very appreciative.”